Bostock's Zoos and Animal Rights is a first-rate book: thoughtful, learned, detailed-and intended to improve the lot of nonhuman animals kept by humans. It would benefit any readers setting out to understand or decide their position on the morality or immorality of zoos. I value his book's contribution.
behavior or as indicating that no cruelty is involved since the natural instinct to fly is not being thwarted.
We can sense just how slippery the concept of natural behavior is when it is broken up by Bostock (pp. 86, 87) into discrete behavioral segments such as "characteristic locomotion," feeding, grooming, courtship, breeding," and "play behavior." Although I value the significance of pointing out palpable criteria that can set apart better and inferior ways of keeping animals in zoos, the concept of natural behavior, if it is meaningful at all, is irreducible to such components. In Garnett (1924) , John Cromartie volunteers to be exhibited in London Zoo as a species of Homo Sapiens. He ardently strives to exhibit natural behavior of a human for the edification of the bewildered spectators. He sits about reading a newspaper or high-brow books, paces around in his cage, and shaves. We could imagine him playing card games, exchanging jokes, even "breeding." Yet all of this would still constitute a perversion of natural behavior rather than a manifestation of it, since there is some overall dimension of natural behavior which is irreducible to these chopped off behavioral segments. I fail to see why this should be different for nonhuman animals. Finally, manifesting natural behavior indicates adaptability rather than well being: some animals are simply more flexible (hence tougher) than others. Yet why should this greater flexibility indicate that they are in a state of well being?
Diminished welfare notwithstanding, what my argument sought to show through appealing to imprisoned humans who are provided with good living conditions, is that zoos involve a deeper moral violation that has nothing to do with compromising welfare. Even if-what is actually highly doubtful-welfare is unmodified (say it is even improved), zoos rely upon an unjustifiable paternalism with regard to animals. Here the difference between Bostock and me strikes me as partly verbal. Bostock admits that zoos violate the right to freedom of animals. I do not place much importance on rights in my own approach to animal ethics and relate to these as parasitical upon more basic attributes that the right-possessing entity exhibits. For me, the best zoos can perhaps avoid inflicting suffering; yet they are nevertheless cruel since they harm the animals; "harm" in a sense which-like the harm involved in comais unrelated to negative experience. Bostock would say that the best zoos can avoid inflicting suffering, but they still violate the animal's right to freedom. Th ere is no substantial difference between us here-apart, of course, from the diametrically opposed evaluations. For Bostock such violation is justified, whereas for me it is not. What lurks behind the different choice of moral language is that "rights" are ghostly, cerebral, abstract entities, whereas cruelty and harm are not. And whereas "somewhat compromising rights" can strike
